Dennis McCarthy – email@example.com – (213) 222-8260
Roche’s hostile offer for Illumina is a great case study to follow up my post “M&A Defense Checklist” and to prove that old adage that “the devil’s in the details”.
The Roche hostile offer for Illumina highlights two of my points,
- Now there is higher risk of hostile activity for all companies. Illumina, before the offer, was trading at 4x revenue and 14x EBITDA: not what you’d consider a low valuation target although its stock at $37.69 was below its 52 week high of $79.40.
- Companies should carefully review their M&A defenses to uncover and potentially fix any weaknesses before an aggressor uses them against the company.
As background on this case, after what appears to be a short courtship period, Roche launched a hostile tender offer to shareholders to buy Illumina at $44.50/share an 18% premium to Illumina’s closing price the day before the offer. Roche also announced that it intends to wage a proxy battle which would result in its slate of nominees comprising a majority of the Illumina board.
In this post, I highlight key points from an impressive article entitled “The Chink in Illumina’s Defense” by Steven M. Davidoff, writing as The Deal Professor, a commentator for the New York Times’ “DealBook”. The article speculates that Roche’s proxy battle strategy will likely include proposals to:
- Nominate board candidates for the 4 seats up for election this year;
- Propose a by-law amendment to expand the size of the board by two members to 11 and nominate those two board candidates; and
- Propose a shareholder vote to remove all of Illumina’s board without cause.
Illumina’s defenses include:
- Staggered board of nine members with only 4 up for election this year;
- Supermajority vote of 67% of all shares outstanding required to amend a by-law;
- Shareholders can’t call a special meeting;
- Shareholders can’t act by written consent; and
- Poison pill which had expired in 2011 but could be reinstated by board action alone.
Proving that time-tested maxim, “the devil’s in the details”, here’s what we might learn from issues with Illumina’s defenses that Roche may be exploiting according to “The Chink in Illumina’s Defense”.
- Certain key elements of Illumina’s defenses are contained in its by-laws, not as charter provisions. A corporate provision contained in a company’s by-laws may be amended by shareholder action without board action. In contrast, a provision in a company’s charter requires approval by both the board and shareholders.
- Illumina’s by-laws specify the size of the board which Roche is proposing to expand by two to eleven members of which Roche’s slate of 6 would constitute a majority. Shareholders can approve, albeit by 67%, this by-law amendments to expand the board without board approval.
- Illumina’s by-laws also permit removal of board members without cause upon approval by a simple majority of the votes cast at the meeting, a relatively low threshold. Delaware law requires the provision for removal of board members without cause to be in a company’s charter so this provision will, no doubt, trigger litigation as to its validity and usefulness in Roche’s attack.
- Illumina’s advance notice provision for submission of proxy proposals to be included for consideration at its annual meeting requires only 90 days vs longer periods which are common. As a result, Illumina has less time to respond before its annual shareholder meeting.
Subsequent to Roche’s offer, Illumina’s share price rose well above Roche’s offer price signaling that Wall Street thinks Illumina is worth more than Roche’s offer. Also, Illumina reinstated its poison pill at a 15% threshold with updated definitions of beneficial ownership to include ownership through derivatives.
This is a valuable lesson for all of us, at Illumina’s expense.